Court upholds refusal of 18 turbine scheme and settles where the benefits go in the balance

UK Construction and Law

Court upholds refusal of 18 turbine scheme and settles where the benefits go in the balance

By Staff Writer  |  18 August 2026

Three white wind turbines on a grassy upland ridge above conifer plantation at Cymmer in Wales under a clear blue sky

The Planning Court has dismissed a statutory review of the refusal of a 129.6 MW wind farm between Port Talbot and Maesteg. The developer argued the inspector should have taken the scheme's renewable energy and community benefits into account when deciding whether the landscape harm was unacceptable. The court held that testing harm first against the policy criteria, and weighing benefits afterwards, was the proper order.

Y Bryn Wind Farm Limited v The Welsh Ministers was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 17 August 2026 at the Cardiff Civil and Family Justice Centre, before His Honour Judge Jarman KC sitting as a judge of the High Court. The claim was brought under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against a decision of 21 November 2025 refusing planning permission. Five grounds had permission from Mould J. None succeeded.

The application was for up to 18 turbines with heights up to 250 metres to blade tip, with new access tracks and highway junctions, in the Bryn and Penhydd forests. It was made under section 62D of the 1990 Act, the route in Wales for projects determined nationally rather than by the local planning authority, and decided under amendment regulations made in 2024. The overall capacity was up to 129.6 MW, put at enough to supply the annual electricity needs of over 85,700 average homes, deliverable by 2029 under an agreed grid connection. The inspector reported on 7 August 2025, having held hearing sessions on 16 and 17 June 2025 and visited the site between 19 and 21 June 2025.

Where the benefits go in the balance

The benefits were never in dispute. The inspector recorded that the scheme would contribute about 7.3 per cent of the remaining shortfall against the Welsh Government target of generating 70 per cent of consumed electricity by renewable means by 2030, would create hundreds of Welsh and local jobs, and would be the first commercial development in Wales to offer community shared ownership together with a community benefit fund of up to £1 million a year. He treated those benefits as carrying weight in favour of the proposal.

The developer's second ground was about sequence rather than substance. Future Wales policy 18 provides that a qualifying renewable project will be permitted subject to policy 17 and eleven criteria, the first of which is that outside pre-assessed areas the proposal does not have an unacceptable adverse impact on the surrounding landscape. The argument was that the benefits belonged inside the question of whether the harm was unacceptable, rather than in a second exercise carried out after that question had been answered.

For the reasons given above I do not accept that submission. In my judgment that was not only a permissible approach but a proper one.

His Honour Judge Jarman KC, sitting as a judge of the High Court

The reasoning is short and portable. Policy 18 sets criteria, and the inspector had to assess unacceptable harm against them. Had he found none, policy directed that the proposal be permitted. Having found it, he then weighed that harm against the undisputed benefits. A promoter cannot use the strength of its own case on need to soften the criterion it has to clear.

A consultee that withdraws an objection has not agreed the harm

The first ground turned on a statement of common ground agreed in March 2025 with Cadw, the statutory heritage consultee, which had objected by letter of 14 May 2024 over effects on the registered historic landscape of Mynydd Margam. The statement recorded that Cadw did not object, and the developer said the inspector had departed from it without giving a chance to respond. The court read the document as it stood: Cadw dropped the objection but never altered its own assessment of adverse impact, and the measures secured by the agreed condition were offsetting rather than mitigating. What was left open was the weighing exercise, and that was for the decision-maker.

The remaining grounds went the same way. A comparison with the same inspector's earlier report on another scheme, said to show that he had graded two weight words in a hierarchy, was read as over legalistic and without the benefit of benevolence. A stray reference to the 1990 Act in the heritage conclusion was accepted as a slip that did not carry through to the planning balance, and a reference to policy SP4 was read as a typographical error for SP3.

Two points survive the site. The order of the questions is fixed by the policy, so benefits do not dilute the harm threshold. And a long schedule of alleged errors in an inspector's report is the least promising way to attack a decision, because the court will read the report as a whole and with a degree of benevolence rather than dissect it line by line.