Lloyds Developments Limited v Accor S.A
| Judge | Mr Justice Eyre |
| Judgment | 13 February 2026 |
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Claimant | Lloyds Developments Limited |
| Defendant | Accor S.A |
Summary
A company in administration had obtained permission to serve a claim form on a French defendant out of the jurisdiction, together with an extension of time for service. The defendant applied to set aside that extension and for a declaration that the court had no jurisdiction.
The defendant said there was no good reason for the extension, and that in any event the claimant had failed to disclose that the extension would, or arguably would, take service past the expiry of the primary limitation period and so bear on a limitation defence. The claimant said its claim was not statute-barred and that there had been no failure of disclosure.
Mr Justice Eyre set the extension aside on both grounds. There was no good reason to extend time, and the claimant had failed to make full disclosure about the limitation position on its without-notice application. The claim form had therefore been served out of time and the court had no jurisdiction to try the claim.
Background and facts
The claimant, a Guernsey company now in administration, had been formed to develop a hotel site in Glasgow. It brought a claim against the French parent of a worldwide hotel group, whose UK subsidiary had contracted with the claimant to build and then manage the hotel. The underlying dispute concerned what the claimant said it had been told about a copyright objection to the hotel's design.
The claim form was issued on 20 December 2024. Because the defendant was in France, permission was needed to serve out of the jurisdiction, and under the rules the claim form had to be served by 20 June 2025. On a without-notice application, the court gave permission to serve out and extended time for service by about three months, and the claim form was served in September 2025.
The issue
The parties agreed that if the extension of time were set aside, the court would have no jurisdiction, because the proceedings would not have been served within the period the rules require. The questions were whether time for service should have been extended at all, and whether, even if it should, the extension should be set aside for material non-disclosure by the claimant.
The decision
Mr Justice Eyre held there was no good reason for the extension. Applying the test in Hashtroodi v Hancock [2004] EWCA Civ 652 and Al-Zahra (PVT) Hospital v DDM [2019] EWCA Civ 1103, and the principle in Cecil v Bayat [2011] EWCA Civ 135 that a defendant's accrued limitation defence should not be circumvented save in exceptional circumstances, he rejected the argument that the claimant's administration was itself a good reason:
"I do not accept that the fact that a claimant is a company in administration can operate as a good reason for extending the time for service beyond the period provided for in the CPR."Mr Justice Eyre, paragraph 37
He held separately that the claimant had failed in its duty of full and frank disclosure on the without-notice application. The claimant's evidence had touched on limitation only briefly, in the context of service out, and had not explained that the primary limitation period would expire during the extension, nor that the claimant would need to rely on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980, nor the basis for that reliance. Following The Libyan Investment Authority v J P Morgan Markets Ltd [2019] EWHC 1452 (Comm), that omission was material:
"I accept that there was no deliberate intention to mislead the court. The point appears to have been overlooked."Mr Justice Eyre, paragraph 64
Even without deliberate concealment, the court had approached the extension on a false basis in an important respect. That failure would on its own have led to the extension being set aside and would have made it inappropriate to grant a fresh extension. On both grounds the extension granted earlier was set aside, the claim form had been served out of time, and the defendant was entitled to a declaration that the court had no jurisdiction to try the claim.
Practical implications
An extension of time for service needs a good reason. Service within the period the rules lay down is the starting point. A claimant seeking to extend that period must show a good reason, and the weaker the reason, the less likely an extension will be granted, particularly where it would carry service past a limitation deadline.
Being in administration is not, by itself, a good reason. Administrators who cause a company to bring proceedings must take the steps needed to comply with the service time limits. The fact of administration, without detailed evidence of specific delays it caused, will not justify an extension.
Full and frank disclosure on a without-notice application includes limitation. An applicant must draw the court's attention to any properly arguable defence or objection, including that an extension would take service beyond the primary limitation period and that the claimant would need to rely on section 32. Deciding for oneself that the point is unanswerable is not a substitute for disclosing it.
Non-disclosure can be fatal even without bad faith. An overlooked point, disclosed to nobody, can still mean the court acted on a false basis. That can lead to the order being set aside and not renewed, and where the order was an extension of time for service, to the loss of jurisdiction over the claim.
Practice points
- Treat service within the period fixed by the rules as the default; an extension requires a good reason, and the court is reluctant to extend where doing so defeats an accrued limitation defence.
- A claimant's administration is not in itself a good reason to extend time for service; provide detailed evidence of the specific steps that administration delayed, if that is the case relied on.
- On a without-notice extension application, disclose the limitation position squarely: that the primary period will expire during the extension, and the basis for any reliance on section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980.
- Material non-disclosure can set aside an extension even where the omission was inadvertent; the loss of an extension of time for service can end the court's jurisdiction over the claim.