A procurement statute written against foreign sabotage was used against a supplier’s opinions, and a judge has struck the designation down

Technology and AI

A procurement statute written against foreign sabotage was used against a supplier's opinions, and a judge has struck the designation down

By Staff Writer  |  29 August 2026

An aerial view of the five sided headquarters building of the United States Department of Defense, with its courtyard, car parks and the river beyond

In a 59 page order issued on Thursday night, a federal judge in California held that the Department of Defense unlawfully retaliated against an artificial intelligence developer over its public objections to the department's plans, and that its designation of the company as a supply chain risk had no proper basis in the statute relied on. The government is expected to challenge the ruling.

The dispute began in February, when the President and the Secretary of Defense accused Anthropic of endangering national security and designated it a supply chain risk. That designation shut the company out of military contracts. It followed the company's refusal to let the department use its models for domestic surveillance or for autonomous weapons, a refusal the company has never made any attempt to keep quiet. It sued in March, alleging an unlawful campaign of retaliation and breaches of its rights to free speech and to due process.

What makes the ruling worth the attention of anyone who supplies a government is the instrument that was used. The designation was the first occasion on which an American company had been publicly labelled a supply chain risk under a procurement statute written to keep foreign sabotage out of military systems. The court found that the contract dispute and the company's public objections did not answer the statutory description of a supply chain risk at all, and that the government's own conduct told against it: it had gone on dealing with the same company while maintaining that the company was a danger.

The reasoning, in the judge's words

The order records that neither the Constitution nor the statute the government invoked permits it to impose sweeping penalties based principally on the company's critique of the administration's views. The judge went further and identified the motive she found on the record, writing that the government had acted from a desire to make a public example of the company for its arrogance in criticising the government, rather than from any articulable basis to believe that it would actually sabotage its model.

The empty invocation of national security is not a blank check to punish and retaliate against government critics.

Rita Lin, United States District Judge

None of this arrived without notice. At a hearing on 30 July the same judge described the department's position as really troubling and as being at odds with the First Amendment, and said the record had grown worse for the department over time. Lawyers for the department argued at that hearing that the nature of these models is so enormous and so opaque that the department cannot assess them the way it assesses a piece of hardware. The judge had already blocked the designation on a temporary basis and blocked enforcement of a directive telling federal agencies to stop using the company's assistant.

Why a construction reader should care

Because the shape of the argument is familiar. A public body holds a statutory power framed in terms of risk, exercises it against a supplier, and treats the risk label as a conclusion rather than as something it has to demonstrate. The court's answer was that the label has to fit the statute, that the evidence has to support it, and that a supplier does not surrender its right to argue in public about the thing it sells merely because the buyer is the state. Exclusion decisions, debarment, and the discretionary grounds in any procurement system all sit in the same territory.

There was no immediate comment from the department or from the White House, and a separate and narrower case, concerning a different rule the department has used to reach the same designation, remains pending in the federal appeals court in Washington DC. The order is 59 pages and it is the document worth reading, not the reaction to it.