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David Alan Kyte v McLaren Automotive Limited and Stratstone Sports Cars Limited
[2026] EWHC 1126 (TCC) | High Court of Justice, Technology and Construction Court
Before Mr Justice Eyre | Heard 11 February 2026 | Handed down 19 May 2026
Interactive Process Flow | Strike-out of an inadequately pleaded vehicle-fire claim
Case Analysis Process Flow
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1. Case Overview
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Case: David Alan Kyte v McLaren Automotive Limited and Stratstone Sports Cars Limited [2026] EWHC 1126 (TCC)
Court: High Court of Justice, Technology and Construction Court
Judge: Mr Justice Eyre
Hearing Date: 11 February 2026
Judgment Date: 19 May 2026
Case No: HT-2024-000131

Mr Kyte's McLaren sports car was destroyed by fire in October 2017. He alleged that negligent or defective rebuild, repair, service or maintenance work by McLaren Automotive or Stratstone caused the fire and claimed damages based on a £2.1 million value. Both defendants applied to strike out the claim for failure to plead the essential factual case (paragraphs 1-5).

Central Legal Test: Under CPR 3.4(2)(a), the pleaded facts had to disclose a legally sufficient cause of action and tell each defendant the case it had to meet. Destruction of evidence, alleged information asymmetry, strict contractual duties and res ipsa loquitur did not remove the need to plead a viable breach and causal mechanism (paragraphs 3-5 and 98-106).
Vehicle History
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The claimant bought the car for £1.029 million in May 2015. McLaren rebuilt it after a June 2015 accident; Stratstone later carried out various works; the fire occurred on 20 October 2017 (paragraphs 1-2).
Claim
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Proceedings began in April 2024 alleging breach of contract and negligence against one or both defendants, but without an adequately particularised fire-causation case (paragraphs 2-5).
2. Procedural History
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Strike-out Applications
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Both defendants applied under CPR 3.4(2), saying the pleading omitted essential facts and was too unclear to answer (paragraphs 3-4).
No Draft Amendment
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The claimant maintained that the pleading was adequate, supplied no draft amendment and identified no further particulars available from his present knowledge (paragraphs 102-105).
3. Defendant's Position
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The defendants said the lengthy interval, multiple expert examinations and absence of a pleaded defect or causal sequence meant there was no viable claim to try (paragraph 4).

No Defined Breach
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The pleading did not identify which work by which defendant was defective or how it caused the fire.
No Permissible Inference
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The defendants had performed limited tasks and relinquished control months or years before the fire, so the event itself did not infer negligence (paragraphs 98-101).
4. Claimant's Position
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The claimant relied on destruction of evidence by fire, information asymmetry, alleged strict contractual liability and res ipsa loquitur to justify less exact pleading (paragraph 5).

Evidence Destroyed
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He argued that fire cases permit causation to be inferred where the incident destroys the evidence needed to identify the precise mechanism.
Control and Strict Duty
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He relied on each defendant's control while carrying out work and argued that strict contractual obligations reduced the required particularity.
5. Court's Analysis
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Pleading Remained Deficient
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The pleaded case did not state essential material facts linking identified work or breach to the fire. General reliance on later destruction and information imbalance did not cure that failure.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Unavailable
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A fire long after limited works and after intervening control was not an occurrence that ordinarily proved negligence by either defendant. McLaren's work ended 22 months before the fire and Stratstone's 6½ months before it (paragraphs 98-101).
No Further Opportunity
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After repeated expert examinations, two years of proceedings and more than eight years since the fire, there was no basis to expect a viable amended case. The claimant had not proposed one (paragraphs 102-105).
6. Decision and Outcome
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Winner: The Defendants (McLaren Automotive Limited and Stratstone Sports Cars Limited) succeeded.

Result: Both strike-out applications succeeded and the whole claim was struck out (paragraph 106). The Claimant (David Alan Kyte) did not succeed on this application.

Practical Effect: The claimant could not proceed to disclosure or trial in the hope that a causal case might emerge later.
Claim Struck Out
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The pleaded causes of action were insufficient under CPR 3.4(2)(a) (paragraph 106).
No Amendment
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No further opportunity to replead was justified on the evidence and chronology (paragraphs 102-105).
7. Key Legal Principles and Practice Points
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Material Facts
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A claimant must plead the material breach and causal facts, even where evidence has been damaged or is held by the defendant.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
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The maxim assists only where the occurrence ordinarily implies negligence and the relevant object was under the defendant's sole control when negligence occurred (paragraphs 98-101).
Amendment
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The court need not grant another opportunity where no viable amendment is proposed and the available evidence has already been explored.
Practice Implications
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For Claimants:
Before issue, connect each alleged task, defect, breach and causal route to a named defendant. Do not use disclosure as a substitute for a pleaded factual foundation.
For Defendants:
Test whether the pleading identifies material facts for duty, breach and causation. A focused CPR 3.4 application may dispose of a case built only on possibility and information imbalance.
General Practice Points:
Fire damage may make proof difficult, but it does not reverse the pleading burden or create an inference against every earlier contractor.
Legal Disclaimer
This interactive process flow is provided for educational and professional development purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The content reflects interpretations and analyses that may not apply to specific circumstances. Contract interpretation depends on specific wording, jurisdiction, and factual context. Always consult qualified legal professionals before making decisions based on this content. SCCSI and its contributors accept no liability for reliance on this material.
This is a module from the Society of Construction Claims Specialists International's Construction Claims and Contracts Certification Programmes.
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